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A large number of studies have failed to find conclusive 
evidence for causal reasoning in nonhuman animals. For example, 
when animals are required to avoid a trap while extracting a 
reward from a tube they appear to learn about the surface-level 
features of the task, rather than about the task’s causal regulari-
ties. We recently reported that New Caledonian crows solved a 
two-trap-tube task and then were able to immediately solve a 
novel, visually distinct problem, the trap-table task. Such transfer 
suggests these crows were reasoning causally. However, there 
are two other possible explanations for the successful transfer: 
sampling bias and the use of a spatial, rather than a causal, 
analogy. Here we present data that rule out these explanations.
Introduction
Over the last decade there has been growing interest in the 
physical cognition of nonhuman animals, particularly those that 
regularly use tools in the wild. Although both tool using and 
non-tool using animals can solve complex physical problems, they 
appear to do so through use of associative learning rather than 
causal reasoning.1-14 This has led to assertions that human physical 
cognition is fundamentally different to that of other animals.15,16
However, in a recent experiment we found that New Caledonian 
crows (Corvus moneduloides) solved two physical problems that 
were visually distinct but shared the same causal relations.17 
Six crows were given a trap-tube problem where they had to extract 
a reward from a tube while avoiding a trap. Three of these crows 
learnt to solve this problem. These crows were then presented 
with a series of transfer tests where the surface-level features of the 
problem were manipulated. These transfer tests showed that the 
crows were using the position of the hole in the tube to success-
fully extract the reward. The crows then solved a visually distinct 
trap-table problem where they had to choose between two rewards, 
one of which was behind a trap. These results suggest that New 
Caledonian crows are able to reason both causally and analogically 
about proximate causal relations. However, there are two alterna-
tive explanations that we did not fully address.
First, we could not completely rule out the possibility that 
New Caledonian crows possess a predisposition to avoid holes. 
In the original experiment six crows were tested and only the three 
that learnt to solve the trap-tube apparatus could then solve the 
trap-table apparatus. This suggests that New Caledonian crows do 
not spontaneously avoid holes when presented with novel physical 
problems. However, the possibility remains that these crows have 
such a disposition, but that it was not found due to the small 
sample size. To test this hypothesis we presented a further eight 
naïve crows with the trap-table apparatus.
The second alternative explanation concerns the relational 
information being transferred from the trap-tube task to the 
trap-table task. The three successful crows could have made 
the transfer by reasoning analogically about a spatial relation, 
such as ‘always avoid pulling food when it is in front of a trap’. 
Alternatively, the crows could have used a causal relation, which 
contains an understanding of why this spatial relation is impor-
tant (i.e., because objects only move along horizontal surfaces). 
We tested between these two possibilities by presenting the three 
successful crows from our initial experiment with an inverted 
trap-tube. If the crows were using a spatial relation they should 
have continued to avoid the hole when it was on the upper 
surface of the tube.
Methods and Results
Sampling bias. We first gave the eight New Caledonian crows 
experience using stick tools to extract meat from a horizontal 
Perspex hole. We then gave them the trap-table apparatus as in 
our original paper. The crows had to avoid the trap while its 
position (left or right) was randomly alternated across two blocks 
of ten trials. None of the eight crows performed above chance 
(Binomial choice, all p-values > 0.05) (Fig. 1). Of the 14 crows 
that we tested on the trap-table (the eight crows here and six in our 
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original paper), only the three that solved the initial trap-tube 
problem solved the trap-table problem.
Spatial analogy. As part of the original experiment the three 
successful crows were presented with an inverted two-trap-tube 
after transfer three and before the trap-table transfer. One of the 
inverted traps had a hole that opened onto the tube, while one did 
not. Subjects could extract the reward from either end of the tube 
as the hole was on the upper surface of the tube. If the successful 
crows had learnt a spatial relation based on the position of the 
food relative to the hole, they should have continued to avoid 
the inverted trap with the hole when presented with this transfer. 
However, all three crows had no significant preference to extract 
the reward from a particular end of the tube (Binomial choice, all 
p-values > 0.05) (Fig. 2).
Discussion
The supplementary results presented here allow us to discount 
two alternative explanations for the successful transfer to the 
trap-table in our original paper. First, New Caledonian crows do 
not have a predisposition to avoid holes when presented with the 
trap-table problem. The transfer by the successful crows therefore 
must be based on what they learnt during their experience with 
the trap-tube apparatus. Second, the crows’ indifference to the 
inverted hole shows that they had not transferred through use of a 
spatial analogy based on the relationship between the hole and the 
food. The crows only avoided the hole when it was in a functional 
position (i.e., in the bottom of the horizontal tube). This supports 
our original claim that the three crows had used a causal analogy 
to solve the trap-table problem.
Our findings highlight the need in experiments with physical 
problems to control for the possibility that animals may solve these 
tasks using spatial rather than causal relations. We therefore suggest 
that the use of visually distinct transfers, in conjunction with tests 
for sensitivity to causal asymmetries, may be useful in pinpointing 
the cognitive strategies that animals employ when solving physical 
problems.
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Figure 1. Performance of eight naïve crows with the trap-table apparatus.
Figure 2. Performance of the three successful crows from the original 
experiment with the inverted two-trap-tube.
